Better Fortunes?
Living Arrangements and Wellbeing of Migrant Youth in Six OECD Countries[1]
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I. Introduction

Between 1970 and 2005, the number of international migrants more than doubled, rising from 82 to 191 million (Freeman, 2006). Migrants disproportionately hail from less developed nations and the vast majority—over two-thirds—seek new destinies in developed countries. Recent U.N. data indicate that nearly 10 percent of the population living in developed regions is foreign born, compared to less than 1.3 percent in developing regions (Zlotnik, 2006). International migration flows also have involved growing numbers of women and children. Despite growing research and policy interest in population movements (GCIM, 2005; UN, 2006) and recognition of the feminization of migration (Morokvasic, 1984; Sassen-Koob, 1984; Tienda and Booth, 1991), the rising prevalence of children and youth has received little systematic scrutiny (see Rossi 2008; Harttgen and Klasen 2008).

One reason for the relative neglect of research about how migration impacts child development is that these lines of inquiry largely operate in non-overlapping spheres, but paucity of data, particularly that suitable for cross-national comparisons is another reason. With the noteworthy exception of the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMMS) and the Programme for

[1] Israel is not an OECD country but it is comparable to the most advanced on several social and economic indicators and has a large foreign-born population, which makes it an inviting comparison.

International Student Assessment (PISA), few international data systems record migrant status of their adolescent respondents and their parents or guardians. There is, however, an emergent literature about the children of immigrants in European countries that is modeled on longitudinal studies conducted in the United States (Mollenkopf, Kasinitz, and Waters, 1997; Portes and Rumbaut, 2001; Rumbaut, et al. 2003). The Integration of the European Second Generation Study (TIES) focuses on late adolescence and young adulthood, to the exclusion of children and young adolescents, and the SSRC cross-national study (*Children of Immigrants in Schools*) excludes non-enrolled youth.[2]

This chapter forges a link between two largely disparate literatures about migration and development and child wellbeing research. The former has largely focused on adults and migrant youth as workers (World Bank, 2007; UN 2006; Lloyd, et al. 2005), while the latter is primarily concerned with the wellbeing of young people, considering differences by nativity only when data so permit (McKenzie 2006; see review by Harttgen and Klasen, 2008). Consequently, whether and how migration improves or diminishes the socio-emotional and economic wellbeing of youth with migration backgrounds remains poorly understood. Release of standardized international public use micro-data samples (IPUMS) for several immigrant-receiving nations offers a propitious opportunity to begin filling this

[2] Children of Immigrants in Schools includes five component projects that examine the transition to adulthood, school funding, post-secondary education, schooling practices and high school integration (social and academic) across a number of countries. These projects use a variety of data sources in addition to original data collection. Other exceptions are case studies that consider child and adolescent *labor* migrants (McKenzie 2006; World Bank 2007; U.N. 2006; Lloyd, et al. 2005) and victims of trafficking or forced conscription (Carey and Kim 2006; Zimmerman 2003). Many and those that document the salutary benefits of remittances when parents migrate (Rossi 2008 provides a comprehensive review for developing countries).

large research gap by characterizing the demographic scope of youth migration and the proximate environments that shape their integration prospects.

Given the heightened risks that come with adjusting to new cultural and linguistic contexts, we focus on household socioeconomic conditions that shape integration prospects for young people. Specifically, we document cross-national variation in the living arrangements of youth with migration backgrounds in six Western countries—France, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Israel and the United States. Methodologically, we illustrate the need for a child-centric perspective that does not assume migrant children and youth live with their parents or in family households. Theoretically we elaborate testable implications about how living arrangements either promote or undermine integration prospects of youth with migrant backgrounds. Our substantive goal is to describe the living arrangements of migrant youth and to identify which arrangements and contexts of reception are most conducive to child wellbeing. By examining variation in the prevalence of parent absence and extended living arrangements as well as size and composition of households, we identify countries where immigrant youth face the most optimistic integration prospects.

Section II characterizes the six Western countries as contexts of reception based on social policies conducive to successful integration and productive youth development. To begin the empirical analyses, which are presented in Section III, we first develop theoretical links between migrant status, living arrangements and indicators of wellbeing, and illustrate how the most vulnerable are excluded from conventional operational definitions of migrant youth. Subsequently we compare

the living arrangements of children and youth according to migration status and consider whether and in what ways living arrangements compromise productive development. We focus on outcomes that portray integration prospects and are correlated with wellbeing, such as school enrollment. The final section summarizes key findings and identifies the social policy arrangements most conducive to successful developmental outcomes of youth with migration backgrounds.

II. Contexts of Reception

Policies of receiving governments, labor markets and local community attributes define what Portes and Rumbaut (2001) dubbed "contexts of reception," namely the social climate and disposition of host nations to integrate newcomers. They distinguish between passive acceptance, which in reception is little more than benign neglect, and active encouragement, which is usually associated with extensive resettlement assistance and easy pathways to acquire citizenship. As the proximal contexts of early socialization, families are even more important than these distal factors in shaping immigrant integration. Young people derive their economic sustenance and emotional support from families—including extended and non-residential arrangements; however, the links between family structure and child wellbeing are seldom considered by migration researchers. This is surprising because migration often disrupts nuclear units, separating youths from one or more of their parents during critical developmental periods (Rossi, 2008).

Although migration has been increasing throughout Europe since the creation of the European Union, there is considerable cross-national variation in the

timing, composition and volume of flows. Our selection of countries was guided by both practical and theoretical considerations. Practically we restricted our focus to nations that met our selection criteria and also participated in the international public use micro-data samples (IPUMS) project (Minnesota Population Center, 2009). Theoretically we sought to represent variation in contexts of reception among nations that qualify as immigrant receiving. Around 2000, the foreign-born population for the six nations ranged from 32 percent for Israel to roughly five percent for both Portugal and Spain (see Table 1). These nations represent long-standing host countries, such as the United States and Israel, and nations that were formerly labor sending nations that are reversed their status to immigrant receiving, such as Spain and Portugal. All four European nations have aging populations, with about 16 percent of their residents aged 65 and over.

Table 1 about here

The six nations differ in other ways that are likely related to wellbeing of migrant children and youth, such as levels of income inequality (lowest for France and highest for Portugal); child poverty rates (lowest for France among the countries with comparable data); and youth employment rates. Particularly striking are the levels of "idleness" during late adolescence, which approach one in four youth ages 15 to 19 in Israel. Idleness refers to youth who are neither employed nor enrolled in school, which signals a problematic transition to adulthood. Educational outcomes also vary considerably, as indicated by the uneven college graduation rates. In the United States and Israel approximately one-in-three persons at 'typical age of graduation' complete postsecondary education compared with less than 20

percent in Greece. Furthermore, performance on the PISA science exam at age 15 reveals inequities between native youth and those with migration backgrounds: every nation except Israel, where the children of immigrants score higher than their host country counterparts, youth with migrant backgrounds fare worse than their host country natives.

We also sought to represent variation in social benefits and policies toward immigrants, most sharply represented by citizenship laws. The last panel of Table 1 shows considerable variation in social expenditures as a percent of GDP, with France the most generous in providing publicly funded social benefits and Israel the lowest, with the United States not far ahead. Despite efforts by the architects of the Treaty of Lisbon to standardize immigration policy across member states, to date no comprehensive set of regulations exist with the notable exception of family reunification and admission of students and researchers (HWWI, 2009:4).[3]

Attempts to establish consistent integration policies also have failed, except for non-binding consensus about the importance of language acquisition and the value of including immigrants in all social programs as a matter of principle rather than law. In the absence of legally enforceable regulations, recommendations by the agreed on by the Council of Ministers are non-binding (HWWI, 2009). The speed at which several nations, including Spain, Greece and Portugal, transitioned from immigrant-sending to host societies for migrants has left national governments ill prepared to accommodate a large influx of foreigners. This is particularly

[3] Several European nations have sought to align their family reunification principles to the European Convention on Human Rights. Principles and practices, however, do not always align.

problematic for young people, who often require language transition programs and cultural adjustment.

Regulation of citizenship also differs across the six nations based on their reliance on birth or descent (or both); in the waiting times for naturalization; and in whether citizenship requirements changed (see Table 2). Theoretically, citizenship represents the highest stage of membership in a nation state (Tienda, 2002). According to the Citizenship Law Dataset compiled by Bertocchi and Strozzi (2008), the United States offers the most generous membership policies because all persons born on U.S. soil automatically acquire citizenship, irrespective of their parents citizenship. In 1948, Israel and Portugal also granted citizenship *jus soli* (by birthplace), but Spanish and Greek citizenship could only be acquired through descent (*jus sanguinis*). France allowed mixed pathways to citizenship then and does so currently.

Table 2 about here

Israel changed its citizenship requirements when it passed the Law of Return in 1950, which gives all persons of Jewish Ancestry and their spouses the right to become citizens upon migrating and settling in the young nation. In addition, Israel allows residents to become citizens through naturalization or marriage, and requires the shortest waiting time for naturalization—less than four years—of the countries compared. By 2001 Spain, Greece and Portugal also had modified their citizenship laws, allowing mixtures of both birth and ancestry to become full-fledged citizens. Waiting periods for naturalization differ appreciably, however, with Portugal, France and Spain imposing the longest terms before immigrants can apply

for citizenship. Immigrants to the United States must wait at least five years to apply for U.S. citizenship, but application rates differ appreciably by regional origin and the requirements to do so have been tightened (e.g., language and civics proficiency). Moreover, since 1996 the value of citizenship has increased because several federal laws differentiated access to social benefits for immigrants according to citizenship status (Tienda, 2002).

Cross-national differences in terms of membership influence not only the integration prospects of young migrants, but also their chances of successful family reunification. Prevalence of parent absence and extended living arrangements provides a window into wellbeing of youth with migration backgrounds in countries with distinct contexts of reception.

III. Living Arrangements and Wellbeing of Migrant Youth

As the most proximate context for child development, family structure influences numerous outcomes for young people. A vast literature shows that children and adolescents reared in single-parent households exhibit lower educational achievements than children living in two-parent households (McLanahan and Sandefur, 1994). Unstable living arrangements resulting from divorce or remarriage also are associated with poor cognitive and behavioral outcomes (Cavanagh, Schiller and Reigle-Crumb, 2006; Fomby and Cherlin, 2007; Osborne and McLanahan, 2007; Cavanagh and Huston, 2006). Research about children living with extended kin produces mixed outcomes, depending on the postulated mechanisms. On the one hand, co-residence with extended kin can

supplement deficits in parental emotional support and economic resources (Cherlin and Furstenberg, 1986; Peréz, 1994; Tienda and Glass, 1985). On the other hand, and depending on age and gender composition, the addition of more members to the household can intensify competition for resources.

Parent absence is particularly deleterious for wellbeing of dependent youth because it often implies declines in economic resources (Bianchi, Subaiya & Kahn, 1997; Holden & Smock, 1991; McLanahan and Sandefur, 1994) and relocation, which can disrupt local friendship networks (McLanahan & Sandefur, 1994; South, Crowder & Trent, 1998). The implications of more complex arrangements, such as extended family or multiple subfamily households, on household resources and child wellbeing are less clear, however. Although additional relatives may provide in-kind resources, such as child care (Jendrek, 1993), extended family structures may reflect a compensatory income-generation strategy for economically precarious families afforded by doubling up (Angel and Tienda, 1982). The significance of extended living arrangements for child wellbeing also depends on their transitory or permanent status and the family life cycle stage when doubling up occurs.

Family change can also be detrimental to household functioning and, ultimately, child wellbeing (Hetherington, 1989). Research focusing on children living with their mothers claims that stresses associated with family change often "spillover" into the parent-child relationship, altering the quality, quantity, and consistency of mothers' parenting (Engfer, 1988). Family change is also expected to alter mothers' emotional resources, rendering the myriad aspects of parenting more difficult (Hetherington, 1989; Meadows, McLanahan & Brooks-Gunn, 2008).

Migration, Family Arrangements and Child Wellbeing

Because migration disrupts families and undermines social ties, part of its influence on child wellbeing operates via changes in living arrangements (Smith, Lalonde and Johnson, 2004). Migration alters living arrangements when family members move separately due to financial constraints or policy barriers that govern family reunification. Many families succeed in reconstituting themselves in their host society, but the process can span over many years. As a consequence of legal barriers and sequential migration of family members, transnational families have been on the rise, with children separated from parents either because they are left behind (Rossi, 2008) or because they move seeking to buttress family income or to pursue education (Suárez-Orozco, Todorova and Louie, 2002). Children who cross borders alone often find themselves in fostering arrangements, at times with relatives, but often with unrelated members of a sending-country network (Mazzucato and Schans, 2008). Children living in migrant households may be more likely to have a shifting roster of residents, or live in crowded households (Capps, 2001).

The disruptive effect of migration on the family is only one facet of the numerous challenges facing children and adolescents migrant backgrounds. Many must also contend with host-country language acquisition and learn to navigate new education and cultural systems as they master age-dependent developmental tasks. Children born to immigrant parents also share their parents' adjustment challenges, such as translating or explaining institutional arrangements. Living arrangements

may amplify other challenges that migrant youth face and may account for some of the social and economic disadvantages that researchers attribute to migration status *per se*.

Research linking family arrangements and child wellbeing tends to be country-specific, and largely U.S.-centric (for a recent review see Amato, 2005). Other literature examines how the impact of family structure varies by country. In some countries, the social safety net provides financial supports that are typically associated with the family, thereby ameliorating the impact of non-traditional structures (Pong et al. 2003; but see Björklund et al. 2007; Breivik and Olweus, 2006). With a few recent exceptions, however, research on comparative family arrangements largely ignores the significance of migration status for young people.

Studies that examine family arrangements by migration status usually focus on a single or small number of countries (e.g. Glick and Van Hook, 2007; Hernández, Denton, and Macartney, 2008; Landale, Oropesa, and Bradatan, 2006, for an exception, see work by Hernández and colleagues in this volume). Because parents' migration status is used to identify youth with migrant backgrounds, studies that examine the impact of family structure on children and youth restrict their focus to those living with *at least one parent*. For youth with migrant backgrounds, this strategy both excludes the most vulnerable young people and underestimates the more unstable living arrangements. The following analyses not only evaluate the significance of this exclusion restriction, but also illustrate the complexity of migrant youths' living arrangements in cross-national perspective.

Data and Operational Definitions

The Integrated Public-Use Microdata Series-International (University of Minnesota, 2009) is a collection of census data files that has been harmonized over more than 44 countries to provide users with comparable measures. Owing to its representativeness and large sample sizes, census data is ideal both to document country-level patterns and to obtain estimates for sub-groups that are too small to represent in survey data. For this study we use the samples provided to the Minnesota Population Center by Israel, France, Greece, Spain, Portugal and the United States.[4] For each of these countries, the files contain the requisite information to link children and youths to household members.[5] To ensure the most comparable universe of youth and to isolate a consistent age-span that precedes employment eligibility in these countries, we restrict our sample to persons under the age of 16.[6]

Because children are presumed to reside in family households, most analysts identify migrant and second-generation youth based on the birthplace of their parents, omitting children living in non-parental units (Hernández, et al. 2007). This approach to identifying migrant youth is reasonable given philosophical support for family reunification as a human rights principle (HWWI 2009) and tendencies for

[4] We would like to also acknowledge the Central Bureau of Statistics in Israel, the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies in France, the National Statistical Office in Greece, The National Institutes of Statistics in Portugal and Spain and the Bureau of the Census in the United States. We use the following samples: Israel (1995), the United States (2000), Greece (2001), France (1999), Portugal (2001) and Spain (2001).

[5] Publically available micro-data for Canada and the United Kingdom did not allow for linkages between household members and, consequently, could not be included despite their importance as prominent immigrant receiving nations.

[6] Israel census data is grouped into age ranges; to avoid including the late adolescent period, we had to restrict the tabulations to youth below the age of 15.

children to be left behind when their parents migrate (Rossi 2008). Practices often differ from principles, however. Because we suspect that conventional approaches exclude the most vulnerable children, rather than assume that migrant youth live with their parents, we used nativity status of children to identify migrant youth and subsequently linked parent characteristics to youth records. This strategy allowed us to differentiate between children born to foreign versus native parents and also to approximate first and second migration generations.[7]

Children are linked to parents in the household through a complex algorithm that utilizes pieces of information such as the link to the household head,[8] the person order of the census listing, the age, marital status and childbearing information of the "potential parent". These links do not differentiate between biological and social parent relationships, such as stepfather or stepmother. Given the limited information available in most census data, even the best linking algorithms will incorrectly link children to adults that are not the child's actual parent (hence the term "potential parent"). Such misclassifications are likely more severe in more complex households, particularly those that include one or more subfamilies. We expect that this linking system may overestimate the existence of the child's parent in the home, which would render our estimates of parent-absent

[7] When children are not living with parents, it is not possible to differentiate between second and third generation. Thus, there is some number of second-generation youths in our category "third generation, not living with parents"; however, we see the benefits of including all youth as outweighing this measurement error.

[8] Complete information on this issue is available through the IPUMS-I website. Parents that are listed adjacent to children are considered the strongest possible links. In combination with other pieces of information, potential parents are allowed to link to a child when they are 10 to 54 years older; the exact age range depends on the relationship to the household head and the type of union. France, Portugal, Spain and the United States did not report childbearing information in the census files analyzed. Therefore in those cases this information cannot be used to improve the accuracy of the linkages. This problem does not appear to affect Spain, which has a pointer variable that links biological children.

living arrangements conservative. Countries differ with respect to the quality of parent-child linkages, therefore some of the differences in living arrangements of migrant youth across contexts likely reflect variation in precision of the links to parents. Given the consistency of our results across contexts, differences attributed to data limitations may be modest.

Living Arrangements of Migrant Youth

Table 3 illustrates how the criteria used to identify youths with migration background via the presence of a parent rather than from the child's perspective, irrespective of parental presence, alters the population estimate. The advantage of including only children linked to parents is that it permits approximating three generational statuses for youths, namely the foreign born, youth born to immigrant parents in the host country ("second generation"), and youth born in the target country to native born parents (third and higher generation status). For youth who do not reside with at least one parent, it is only possible to distinguish between native- and foreign-born youth.[9] The major disadvantage is that researchers exclude the most vulnerable, namely youth who do not reside with either parent.

Table 3 about Here

A comparison of the sample sizes in the upper and lower panel reveals the consequences of using parents' nativity to identify children and youth with migration backgrounds. The number of migrant children and youth who do not live

[9] Because second generation status can only be determined in the censuses we examine when children are living with parents, tabulations for second generation youth do not vary when children living without parents are included in the sample. Landale and colleagues (2006) , using other data, estimate that a smaller proportion of second-generation Mexican youth in the U.S. live in non-parental households compared to 3+ generation youth, but we are unaware of any prevalence measures for living arrangements or other countries.

with at least one parent ranges from a high of seven percent in Israel to less than two percent in France, with the other countries around the midpoint of these extremes (four percent for the United States and Greece versus three percent for Portugal and Spain). The estimates for Greece are conservative because the census does not identify individuals living in group quarters. In all countries, the vast majority of youth under age 16 reside with two parents, but there is noteworthy variation across countries. Among children living with parents (in the top panel), the United States and France stand out as the only countries where the share of third generation youth living with two parents is lower than that of second or first generation youth. For the U.S., this largely reflects the high shares of mother-only black and Puerto Rican families (Landale, et al., 2006).

Despite many country endorsements of family reunification as an important aspect of immigration policy, nontrivial shares of youth under 16 do not live with either parent, as revealed by the lower panel of Table 3. Identifying youth with migration backgrounds by imposing a co-residence requirement necessarily inflates the shares living with two parents, particularly those born outside of the target country. For example, in France the share of foreign-born youth who reside with two parents drops seven percentage points when migrant youth who do not reside with parents are included in the sample. As a consequence, and contrary to estimates based only on youth residing with parents, migrant youth in France are less advantaged relative to third generation youth. For Spain the differentials are even more pronounced: less than two in three foreign-born youth lived with two parents according to the most recent census, a difference of approximately 14

percentage points compared with estimates based on co-residence matched parents.[10] Even in Greece, the nation where two-parent households are most prevalent irrespective of generational status, the share of foreign born youth who reside with two parents is seven percentage points lower when youth residing without their parents also are counted.

Table 4 provides further insight into the living arrangements of youth under 16 years of age by generational status and household composition. Complex living arrangements may include either one or both parents, but also other relatives, unrelated subfamilies, or non-family members, such as boarders. Of particular interest are the shares of youth who live in complex families and those who reside with no parent. In all countries, foreign born youth are more likely than their host country counterparts to live in complex family structures, although the levels differ appreciably, from single digits in France to between 30 and 40 percent in the United States and Spain, respectively. Second generation youth living in the United States, Greece and Spain also tend to live in doubled up households, which likely reflects the arrival of relatives from source countries or temporary housing support for host country relatives who relocate. Despite these country-specific differences, in all six countries foreign-born youth who live with both parents also are more likely than their native born counterparts in similar arrangements to experience more varied and complex living arrangements.

[10]Although cross-sectional data do not allow us to adjudicate between two mechanisms that undergird the number of youth residing without parents, the data are consistent with the arrival of child beachheads who are sent ahead of their parents to live with early network settlers as well as a pattern of independent youth settlement that might involve large numbers of undocumented migrant youth.

Table 4 about Here

In general, foreign-born youth are more likely than their third generation counterparts to reside with neither parent, which puts them at risk of poor developmental outcomes. Israel is a notable exception to this pattern, but two important differences vis-à-vis the other countries considered may be responsible for the deviation. First is the Law of Return, which not only confers automatic citizenship on all persons of Jewish ancestry who immigrate to Israel for permanent resettlement, but also the resettlement assistance offered to returnees. This ranges from intensive language training, loans for homes and transportation, and job training. A second reason is the existence of communal living arrangements (Kibbutzim), which may offer safe haven for young people who move without their parents. Although less than five percent of the Israeli population lives communally, this arrangement is convenient as a transitory venue for family reconstitution if relatives arrive at different times and may account for the high shares of youth who do not reside with their parents. Unfortunately the Israeli census does not permit us to link parents and youth living communally with any precision.

Typically foreign-born youth are two to three percentage points more likely to live without their parents compared with youth born in the host country, with the notable exception of Spain, where over one in six foreign-born youth ages 0 to 15 do not live with either parent. Depending on the age at arrival, this arrangement places youth at high risk of poor academic and socio-emotional outcomes, particularly during childhood and early adolescence (Landale, et al., 2006). One possible reason that Spain's migrant youth appear to face the least favorable living arrangements

may reflect the greater measurement precision because its census has a specific pointer to biological parents. This pointer may reduce erroneous linkages to adults that are not the child's parent, particularly in more complex households. Thus, rather than assert that migrant youth in Spain are more disadvantaged based on their living arrangements, it is conceivable that the prevalence of non-parental residence among the foreign born youth is much higher in the countries that require approximations to link "probable parents" with children.

To consider how living arrangements are associated with migration background, we examine both length of residence and school enrollment status. The former indicates whether extended and nonfamily arrangements are likely to be transitory or enduring features influencing developmental trajectories of youth, and the latter is a key marker for a range of subsequent outcomes related to the transition to adulthood. Only four countries report arrival and enrollment outcomes for their foreign-born population, however.

Table 5 shows that in the U.S. and Greece, children living outside a parental household tended to be recent immigrants, which could indicate a temporary arrangement until the family was fully reconstituted. In the U.S., 50 percent of youth under age 16 years who did not live with either parent arrived less than two years before the census, but only 30 percent of those living in two-parent nuclear families. Recently arrived youth who live with their parents also are highly likely to reside in complex household arrangements (38 percent) in the United States, which is consistent with temporary doubling up strategies as foreign-born residents become acclimated to their host society.

Table 5 about Here

These findings are also in line with research (not limited to youth) by Van Hook and Glick (2007), which shows that recent U.S. immigrants are more likely to live in extended family households or non-kin households compared with earlier arrivals or native residents. Presumably earlier arrivals have had more time to reunite their families and find alternative housing. Similar patterns for migrant youth to reside in complex parental households obtain for other countries as well. For example, in Spain 57 percent of youth living in complex arrangements were recent arrivals, and in all countries compared proportionately more recently arrived youth live in complex arrangements than in two-parent nuclear families.

Age and gender distributions (not shown) revealed small differences by generation and living arrangements. For example, foreign-born youth living without parents are slightly older than their counterparts residing in family arrangements, which is to be expected given the higher demands on parents from young children. Also, larger shares of boys reside in non-parental arrangements in France, Israel and the United States, but only among foreign-born youth. Overall, gender differences in living arrangements are small and the age and sex distributions do not indicate systematic vulnerabilities along these lines.

Other analyses not reported examined the household structure for youth who do not live with parents. The majority of these youths—both native- and foreign-born alike—reside within multi-generational or composite (a mix of family

and non-family members) households.[11] Whether these family households include members of the youth's extended family (e.g. siblings, cousins or 'fictive' kin) surely influences the nature and quality of emotional and financial support available, but census data do not permit us to establish ties among all members. Finally, we may be most concerned about children living outside the structure of a family. The presence of a family, even if it excludes children's own parents, may provide routines, resources and emotional support not available for those residing in group quarters. Although the prevalence of nonfamily living arrangements is low, foreign-born youth are more likely than their native-born counterparts to live in these precarious arrangements. For example, in Spain, approximately 15 percent of foreign-born youth, but only 6 percent of native-born youth living without parents resided in households without an identifiable family. In both Israel and France, nontrivial shares of children live in group quarters: these shares range from 17 to 56 percent, depending on generational status. In Israel, approximately 40 percent of foreign-born youth who do not live with parents reside in group quarters, compared to only 17 percent of native-born youth.

Census data lack a rich set of youth outcomes to gauge wellbeing, but do include a key status that has lifelong consequences, namely school enrollment status. If living arrangements link migration status to child outcomes, we expect lower enrollment rates among foreign-born youth, but especially those who do not reside with parents. Table 6 reports school enrollment status by family

[11] In Israel, 28% of foreign-born and 63% of native-born youth living without parents are living in households so complex as to be "unclassifiable"; in other countries children are rarely living in unclassifiable arrangements.

arrangements, generation and country. Children living in complex family arrangements and nonparental households fare worse with respect to school enrollment, irrespective of generational status. However, only in the United States are foreign-born children educationally disadvantaged if they do not reside with parents; about three-fourths of school-eligible youth are enrolled compared with 89 percent of similarly situated native-born youth. Auxiliary analyses (not shown), reveal that the U.S. nativity disadvantage is evident in both early educational enrollment (before the age of 6) and later enrollment (ages 13-15). In the other countries that report enrollment status, foreign-born youth are enrolled at similar or higher rates as third generation youth.

Table 6 about Here

Equally striking are the occasionally low rates of enrollment of second-generation youth; in most countries this pattern is driven by lower enrollment in early education.[12] For example, only 60 to 66 percent of second- and third generation Portuguese youth living in complex families are enrolled in school, which is lower than the rates for youth living without parents. Among school-age youth residing with two parents, Portuguese youth average lowest enrollment rates among the countries compared. Why over one-in-four native born Portuguese school-age youth who reside with both parents are not enrolled in school warrants further disaggregation by place of residence and family economic circumstances.

[12] Early education, before the age of six, may include programs such as pre-kindergarten; thus some portion of these enrollment tabulations may reflect opting out of optional educational training rather than nonenrollment during compulsory years. Yet, these early educational experiences are associated with positive outcomes at school-entry and thereafter for children, and in many countries maximizing enrollment in such programs is a goal. Although these tabulations are occasionally based on small sample sizes, early enrollment is pervasive in France and Spain (>75%), but much lower in the United States (50-65%) and Portugal (45-60%).

This level of non-enrollment surely represents formidable risks for the transition to adulthood, but appears to be more serious for the second generation, and particularly those reared in complex families. Spain's second-generation youth also appear to be educationally disadvantaged based on school enrollment status across all three types of family structure, which may signal incomplete integration during a period of rapid immigration. In their transition from migrant sending to migrant receiving nations, Spain and Portugal appear to lack the integration infrastructure available in nations with long-standing immigration traditions, like the United States and France. However imperfect these systems, both nations appear better equipped to accommodate, if not fully integrate, youth with migrant backgrounds into their schools.

IV. Conclusions

Migration is both a risk and an opportunity for child development. International movement represents a great opportunity for youth who can avail themselves of better education systems compared with their origin nations, but this presumes that there are no barriers to entry. Unfortunately, census data precludes comparisons with comparable nonimmigrant youth from the origin countries, which is necessary to draw causal inferences about improved or diminished educational outcomes. Source countries to the receiving nations differ appreciably, partly as a matter of history and geography, and partly due to immigration policies and reception contexts that determine eligibility for admission and access to social supports.

On the risk side of the ledger, family disruption, particularly when moves involve separation from parents at young ages, has deleterious consequences for child wellbeing. Severance of ties from extended relatives and friends also undermines normative development. Demands of cultural and structural assimilation further complicate the challenges of normative development, especially if youth must master a new language and adjust to different cultural expectations. Age at migration, which we could not systematically consider with census data, influences the pace and scope of adjustment to their new environments, but so also do the living arrangements that function as proximate settings for socialization and integration. On this dimension youth with migration backgrounds differ from their native counterparts in ways that place them at greater risk of poor outcomes, but there is great variation among the countries compared.

Using co-residence as a marker of living arrangements most conducive to child wellbeing, youth with migration backgrounds fare best in Greece. Based on the share of migrant youth who do not live with both parents, the most precarious living arrangements occur in Spain, where over one-third of all foreign-born youth under 16 years of age do not reside with either parent. In all of the nations considered, however, anywhere from 15 (Greece) to 23 percent (Israel) of foreign-born youth reside with only one parent or none. We argued that residence in some form of family arrangement is preferable to institutional group quarters, but differences in measurement precision across census files hampered our ability to draw firm inferences.

The unusually high share of foreign-born youth who do not live with either parent in Spain likely signals the more precise identification of actual parents, compared with other nations where linking algorithms could only approximate "probable parents" based on the composition of family households. Still, the pervasiveness of non-parent and sole-parent households with migrant youth does not bode well for their long-term welfare. Variation in school enrollment status by family living arrangements provides further evidence about the precarious wellbeing of youth with migration backgrounds, particularly in Portugal and Spain.

Despite many strengths, census data at best provide snapshots of children's living arrangements, which can not portray the degree of instability that faced by migrant children and youth. Neither can we distinguish the strength of the couple union for families where both parents are present. Recent research in the United States reveals that the 'married or cohabitating parents' versus 'single parent' dichotomy obscures complex variation in children's exposure to family instability that in turn influences wellbeing of youth (Beck, Cooper, McLanahan and Brooks-Gunn, Forthcoming; Cavanagh & Huston, 2006; Fomby & Cherlin, 2007; Osborne & McLanahan, 2007).

Our key youth outcome does require further policy attention to prevent migration from generating social and economic divisions between native and foreign-born youth. Given that enrollment in primary and secondary school is not systematically associated with migration status in most contexts, it is conceivable that country-specific laws are responsible for upholding mandatory enrollment requirements. Further analyses are required to substantiate this possibility and to

identify whether migration for the purpose of improving educational prospects is responsible for the higher enrollment rates among foreign-born youth in France, Portugal and Spain. Improving educational prospects of both native and foreign-born youth is both actionable and essential to promote successful transitions to adulthood and ensure that young people acquire the necessary skills to replace the aging workers of their host countries and contribute to economic productivity rather than become dependents of the state.

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Table 1. Contexts of Reception: Demographic, Economic and Social Characteristics for Israel, the United States, Greece, France, Portugal and Spain circa 2000

Country	ISR	US	GRC	FRN	POR	SPN
Demographic Context						
Total Population (in 1000s)	6084	282194	10918	59049	10226	40264
As a Percent of the Total Population						
Population 65 or Older	9.9	12.4	16.6	16.1	16.2	16.8
Foreign-Born	32.3[a]	11.0	10.3[b]	7.4	5.1	4.9
Economic Context						
GDP Per Capita ($US)	23302	34574	18389	25232	17067	21295
Income Inequality: Gini Coefficient[3]	.362[5]	0.381	0.321	0.281	0.416	0.319
Child Poverty Rate (aged 0-17)	NA	20.6	13.2	7.6	16.6	17.3
Labor Force Context						
Youth Employment, Ages 15-24	28.2	59.7	26.9	23.2	42.0	36.3
Idle Males, 15-19[c]	26.2	6.8	6.9	3.4	6.2	7.7
Idle Females, 15-19[c]	24.9	7.3	11.2	3.2	9.2	8.2
Educational Context						
College Graduation Rates (at typical age of graduation)	32.2[2]	34.4	14.5	24.5	23.2	30.4
Performance on science scale (PISA), age 15 [d]						
Foreign Born	467.7	441.7	428.2	437.7	411.6	427.9
Third + Generation	461.9	498.9	477.6	504.5	478.5	493.6
Second Generation	444.6	456.1	NA	456.3	NA	NA
Public Expenditures						
Social as a % of GDP	11.9	14.5	19.2	27.9	19.6	20.3

Source: Unless noted, data from OECD, year 2000. [a] *1995 Census, IPUMS-International. Authors' calculation.*

[b] *2002 OECD.* [c] *2004 OECD.* [d] *2006 OECD.* [e] *2007-2008 Human Development Report.*

Notes: Idle indicates neither employed nor in school.

Table 2. Regulation of Citizenship in Six OECD Nations, 1948-2001

Country	ISR	US	GRC	FRN	POR	SPN
Citizenship Laws						
1948	jus soli	jus soli	jus sanguinis	mixed	jus soli	jus sanguinis
1975	jus sanguinis	jus soli	jus sanguinis	mixed	jus soli	jus sanguinis
2001	jus sanguinis	jus soli	mixed	mixed	mixed	mixed
Time to Naturalization (in years)	4	3	--	3	2	2

Source: The Citizenship Laws Dataset. Bertocchi and Strozzi, 2009.

Notes: "jus sanguinis": countries subject to jus sanguinis (by descent) without any jus soli (by birthplace) element.

"mixed": countries that apply a mixed regime reflecting elements of both jus soli.

"jus soli": countries subject to full jus soli.

Table 3. Percent of Youth Residing in Two-Parent Households, by Migrant Generation, Ages 0-15

Country	ISR[a]	US	GRC	FRN	POR	SPN
Living in Parental Households						
Foreign Born	84.0	83.9	91.8	86.0	85.5	76.8
Second Generation[b]	94.7	86.8	95.7	89.9	92.6	86.6
Native Born to Native Parents (3 + Generation)	93.3	77.9	93.1	83.6	92.4	88.7
N	149,757	2,907,960	151,917	578,722	79,185	302,356
All Youth						
Foreign Born	77.1	78.1	85.1	79.1	79.4	62.6
Native Born (3 + Generation)	84.0	74.4	88.9	84.5	89.5	86.2
N	161,030	3,024,887	158,605	587,191	81,606	312,622

Source: IPUMS-I, Minnesota Population Center

[a] *Israel is through age 14.*

[b] *Second generation can only be ascertained when a parent is present; therefore, there are no differences by universe of youth.*

Table 4. Living Arrangements of Youth by Generation, Ages 0-15

	Israel[a]			United States			France		
	FB	2nd	3rd +	FB	2nd	3rd +	FB	2nd	3rd +
Both Parents	60.5	87.5	78.6	55.0	63.7	65.3	72.5	84.0	81.4
Single Parent	10.5	4.1	4.6	8.4	8.0	15.9	13.3	8.7	12.5
Complex Family	21.3	8.4	7.0	30.3	28.4	14.7	8.9	7.2	4.5
No Parent	7.7	--	9.8	6.4	--	4.1	5.3	--	1.7
N (in 1000s)	*14.2*	*45.6*	*104.0*	*164.6*	*545.5*	*2,533.0*	*18.1*	*122.8*	*452.8*

	Greece			Portugal			Spain		
	FB	2nd	3rd +	FB	2nd	3rd +	FB	2nd	3rd +
Both Parents	64.8	77.4	73.9	64.8	78.4	75.6	35.6	69.0	76.1
Single Parent	5.6	3.5	5.3	10.1	5.4	5.7	8.3	5.4	7.4
Complex Family	23.2	19.1	16.5	18.5	16.2	15.7	38.8	25.6	13.7
No Parent	6.4	--	4.3	6.6	--	2.9	17.3	--	2.8
N (in 1000s)	*12.5*	*19.4*	*136.9*	*3.6*	*10.1*	*75.0*	*12.4*	*19.6*	*287.0*

Source: IPUMS-I, Minnesota Population Center

[a] *Israel is through age 14.*

[b] *Second generation can only be ascertained when a parent is present.*

Table 5. Percent of Foreign-Born Youth Ages 0-15 by Living Arrangement and Years Since Arrival

	Both Parents	Single Parent	Complex Family	No Parent
Israel				
<= 4 years	43.7	48.0	46.7	42.1
5 to 6 years	41.9	38.5	47.0	41.4
7 + years	14.4	13.5	6.3	16.4
N	*8,600*	*1,491*	*3,030*	*1,101*
United States				
<= 2 years	30.0	23.4	37.5	49.5
3 to 5 years	27.1	25.1	25.7	21.6
6 + years	42.9	51.5	36.8	28.8
N	*85,048*	*13,069*	*46,814*	*2,842*
Greece				
<= 2 years	18.0	16.3	20.7	34.7
3 to 5 years	36.3	36.8	37.1	35.4
6 + years	45.7	46.9	42.2	30.0
N	*6,022*	*435*	*2,022*	*557*
Spain				
<= 2 years	46.3	37.5	57.1	44.6
3 to 5 years	20.7	25.9	17.7	21.0
6 + years	33.0	36.6	25.1	34.3
N	*4,417*	*1,035*	*4,826*	*2,088*

Source: IPUMS-I, Minnesota Population Center

Note: Year of Immigration not available in France and Portugal

Table 6. Percent of School Eligible Youth Enrolled in School by Living Arrangement and Generation

	Both Parents	Single Parent	Complex Family	No Parent
United States				
FB	93.6	95.4	88.8	78.3
2nd	88.6	92.0	85.0	--
3 +	91.0	92.7	88.7	89.7
France				
FB	90.2	91.2	86.8	73.9
2nd	*82.4*	*88.4*	*79.0*	--
3 +	81.1	88.0	75.9	80.1
Portugal				
FB	86.7	91.8	80.3	88.8
2nd	60.9	73.3	59.9	--
3 +	71.7	81.2	66.5	81.7
Spain				
FB	89.5	91.4	87.8	86.7
2nd	80.4	80.4	66.7	--
3 +	86.6	86.3	81.1	72.5

Source: IPUMS-I, Minnesota Population Center

[a] *Includes early education*

[b] *Second generation can only be ascertained when a parent is present.*

Note:School enrollment is only asked of youth 16 and older (Israel) and is not asked in Greece.